[version 1; peer review: 3 approved]
No competing interests were disclosed.
Russia’s unprovoked attack against Ukraine entails significant implications to Japan’s security and its surrounding environment. How is Japan responding to Russia’s use of force? What are the drivers of its responses? This case study examines official speeches by Japanese leaders and government senior officials, government announcements, opinion polls, and analyses by Japan experts to understand Tokyo’s perceptions and responses to Moscow’s military attack against Kiev.
Seen from Tokyo, the invasion of Ukraine is not only an attack against the rules-based international order but also a manifestation of Japan’s security concerns regarding China’s growing military capabilities and closer Russia-China alignment, especially the potential use of military force to change the Indo-Pacific region’s power balance. This article also finds that Tokyo’s response to Russia-China alignment and the Ukraine invasion continues to be wedded to an approach is characterized by a mixture of engagement, resilience, and deterrence, aiming at both Russia and the growing Russia-China alignment.
Russia’s unprovoked attack on its neighbour, Ukraine, on 24 February 2022 is a transformative event in international politics. Beyond the security implications for Europe, which include a total collapse of the Russia-European Union partnership and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) revival, the invasion has an outsized impact on East Asian security, in particular the growing alignment between Moscow and Beijing and increasing tensions in the already acrimonious relationship between China and the United States (U.S.).
Following Russia’s attack on the rules-based international order, Japan has demonstrated an unusually robust response. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida wasted no time in condemning Moscow’s territorial ambitions, announcing that Tokyo will coordinate with other G7 partners to impose sanctions on Russia, which include travel bans for designated Russian individuals and entities, asset freezes, and import/export restrictions.
While deterrence in the form of sanctions constitutes a critical part in Japan's approach, Tokyo is also particularly concerned with energy security and supply chain resilience being impacted by the war. Russia has been a major energy supplier for Japan, especially thermal coal, liquefied natural gas (LNG), and oils. Since Tokyo is committed to phasing out Russian coal and oil imports, it has introduced measures to stabilize energy supplies in the coming winter. The most notable move is Kishida’s plan to develop and operate 17 nuclear plants.
At the same time, Japan has not completely shut down possibilities for engagement with Russia. Tokyo continues to buy Russian oil, coal, and LNG, partly out of a practical calculation given soaring energy prices and a looming electricity crunch in the winter.
This article aims to address two questions: (1) How did Japan perceive Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and (2) How has Japan responded to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine so far? The multifaceted nature of Japan’s response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine shows that Tokyo perceived Moscow’s actions in three levels. First, the invasion represents a clear violation of the Westphalian principles of state sovereignty and independence, which underpin the modern international system between sovereign states. For Japan, the violation is even more flagrant given the current dispute over the Northern Territories/Kuril Islands and Tokyo’s hope to push for a negotiated settlement, signalling Moscow is an unreliable partner that has no regard for international law. Second, Russia’s military action also challenges the rules-based international order that Japan depends on for its prosperity and security. It is seen by Tokyo as a trampling of rule-of-law and signals the return of ‘might makes right’ in international politics. Third, the invasion highlights potential threats posed by a developing China-Russia axis to Japan’s national security. Sino-Russia growing alignment since 2014 has led Japan to be more concerned about its security after observing the closer military collaboration between Moscow and Beijing, particularly the increasing number of joint naval and aerial operations in Japan’s neighbourhood. Finally, Tokyo is gravely concerned that if Moscow succeeds in challenging the international rules-based order, it will embolden Beijing to emulate Russia’s attempts to achieve China’s core interests, with far-reaching implications for Tokyo.
Tokyo’s multifaceted perceptions of the Ukraine’s invasion, especially its concerns about the combined threats emanating from Sino-Russia alignment and Beijing's possible emulation of Moscow's attempt to secure its core interests by force, requires a multifaceted response. This article argues that Tokyo thus pursued a three-pronged strategy, which constitutes of punishing Russia's actions (and thus deterring China from attempting to do so), engaging with other countries (including with like-minded partners among liberal democracies and Global South states) to strengthen the rules-based order, and putting resilience into its energy security and supply chains. The first prong of the strategy – deterrence (by punishment) - includes economic sanctions on Russia, non-lethal military assistance for Ukraine, and robust rhetoric condemnations of Russia's invasion in international institutions and with other diplomatic partners. Simultaneously, Tokyo attempts to secure its energy supplies and to instil resilience in its supply chains. Finally, the last aspect of Japan's strategy - engagement - sees Tokyo maintaining a certain degree of economic exchange with Russia and working with like-minded partners to strengthen the international rules-based order. Therefore, Japan’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine not only aims to punish Moscow for its violation of international law but also underscores Japan’s emphasis on preserving a rules-based order.
The article will analyse both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include official speeches by Japanese leaders and government senior officials, government announcements, and opinion polls. These can be accessed through the websites of the Prime Minister’s Office, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan’s Ministry of Defense, and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). These data can also be collected from Japan’s news agencies such as Jiji Press, Kyoto News, and NHK, along with Japan’s major newspapers, including The Japan Times, Nippon, Asahi Shimbun, The Mainichi Shimbun, and Nikkei Asia. They provide direct answers to the first research question by detailing responses by Japanese leaders, reactions from the Japanese public, and government directions to handle the fallout of the crisis. Secondary sources consist of analyses by Japanese authors and other experts in books, peer-reviewed articles, and policy reports on the websites of mass media, think-tanks, and academic journals. These sources allow glimpses into how Tokyo’s perceived Russia’s invasion of Ukraine within the backdrop of China’s assertiveness in the region and the growing Sino-Japanese alignment. They demonstrate how Japan’s response to Russia’s military actions is not only meant to punish Moscow for violating international laws (i.e., sovereignty and territorial integrity) but also to deter China from emulating by mobilizing support from other states for Japan’s agenda of supporting the rules-based order and closing off Japan’s vulnerabilities in its energy security and supply chains.
The article is arranged into four parts. The first section introduces the topic and research questions. The second part analyses how Tokyo frames the war in Ukraine and its implications through the lens of Japan’s national security and its interests in upholding the rules-based order. The article envisions Japan's response as a three-pronged strategy and analyses each aspect of this strategy. The final part summarizes the findings of the article.
At the most basic level, Japan sees Russia’s aggression in Ukraine as a clear violation of the Westphalian principles of state sovereignty and independence, which underpin the modern international system between sovereign states. Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida condemned Russia in his speech on the day after the invasion:
“Despite these efforts by the international community, the recent Russian invasion of Ukraine is a unilateral attempt to change the status quo by force and is a clear violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is a violation of international law. As an act that shakes the foundation of the international order, it is absolutely unacceptable and we strongly condemn it. This cannot be overlooked from the perspective of national security. We will work closely with the international community, including the G7, and strongly urge Russia to immediately withdraw its forces and comply with international law.”
From Tokyo’s perspective, Moscow’s actions are even more dangerous given that Russia and Japan have not solved their disputes over the Northern Territories/ Kuril Islands. Russia’s aggression also serves as another warning bell for Tokyo over its precarious security environment. In the financial year (FY) 2021, Japan’s Air Self-Defense Force had to deploy its aircrafts 266 times in response to intrusions of its Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) by Russian aircraft, which mostly occurred in the Sea of Japan.
These exercises prompted senior Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) lawmaker Kono Taro to say that the drills “clearly shows that if anything happens with Taiwan that we will be affected.”
Russia’s military action also challenges the rules-based international order that Japan depends on for its prosperity. For Japan, which has steadfastly supported rule-of-law and good governance principles in its engagement with the world, particularly through its Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision and aid policy, these actions cannot be ignored. If Russia can escape the consequences of its actions largely unscathed, it will signal the return of ‘might makes right’ and legitimize the use of force to change the status quo in international politics, thus severely weakening the rules-based international order. This concern is apparent in every statement from the Japanese government concerning the situation in Ukraine. At a press conference right after Putin’s announcement of his ‘special military operation’, Kishida strongly condemned the action as “undermining the roots of the international order” and said Japan “will not accept a unilateral change to the status quo by force or coercion”.
Illustrative examples of these statements pre-invasion and post-invasion include the Biden-Suga Summit in March 2021, the G7 Joint Statement in May 2021, the Tokyo Quad statements of May 2022 and the speech by PM Kishida at the Shangri La Dialogue. The 2022 joint Quad leaders’ statement from Tokyo “reiterated our strong resolve to maintain the peace and stability in the region. We underscored unequivocally that the centrepiece of the international order is international law, including the UN Charter, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states. We also emphasized that all countries must seek peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with international law.”
The war highlights potential threats posed by a developing China-Russia axis to Japan’s national security. After the Crimea annexation and U.S./ European Union (EU) sanctions against Russia, Moscow has grown more and more reliant on Beijing as a premier trade partner, an alternative source for technology and finance, and a like-minded partner in pushing back against the U.S. in international governance.
Furthermore, Tokyo is gravely concerned that if Moscow succeeds in challenging the international rules-based order, it will embolden Beijing to emulate Russia’s attempts to achieve China’s core interests, with far-reaching implications for Tokyo. First, Beijing's recent missile tests in protest of the U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, with ballistic missiles failing into Japan’s EEZ, underscore Japan’s vulnerability to a kinetic conflict in and around Taiwan. Japan's westernmost island is less than 100 miles from Taiwan's East coast, making a spilling of conflict highly likely. Second, Japan’s main sea trade routes pass through the East China Sea, Taiwan and the South China Sea.
In the case of the Ukraine war, active fighting and sanctions sharply reduced Ukrainian and Russian exports of petroleum products, grains, vegetable oils, and other agricultural products, causing global energy and food crises.
Third, Japan, along with other countries and political entities such as Taiwan, is thinking about the Ukraine war in terms of the importance of embedding countries in multi-layered and multilateral institutions. These might include alliances, reciprocal access agreements (such as between Australia and Japan, as well as between the UK and Japan), minilateral agreements, and trade agreements like the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement. These multilateral and multi-layered agreements help connect Japan to the outside world, giving major powers a stake in this country’s security and stability and compelling them to intervene in the case of a crisis. In short, Japan sees Ukraine not being part of NATO, not being embedded in a series of multilateral and multi-layered agreements as being one of the reasons Russia was able to invade without the threat of direct intervention by the U.S., the E.U., and other stakeholders.
Tokyo’s approach manifests in a three-pronged strategy, combining deterrence, resilience and engagement. Deterrence focuses on not only punishing Russia for its actions, but also discouraging it and China from conducting similar attempts in other areas. Resilience aims to nurture Japan’s resilience against overdependence on Russia and/or China in energy security and supply chains. Engagement includes keeping a limited level of economic cooperation with Russia and working together with like-minded middle powers to bolster the rules-based order.
The deterrence aspect in Japan’s strategy includes financial sanctions and travel bans on Russian individuals and entities; non-lethal military assistance Ukrainian defence force; rallying developing countries to condemn Russia; and commitments to increase Japan's defence spending. Following the launch of Russia’s military actions in Ukraine, Tokyo announced a package of sanctions against Moscow, which includes financial measures, trade measures, and visa measures.
Among them, the financial sanctions are the most comprehensive: restrictions on transactions with Russia's central bank, asset freeze of 11 Russian banks, excluding selected Russian banks from the SWIFT messaging system, and asset freeze of Russian leaders and senior officials (including President Putin) and Russian oligarchs. Recently, the Japanese government also has prevented financing for Russia from international financial organizations and introduced measures to prohibit new investments in Russia.
In addition to sanctions, Japan also immediately provided non-lethal military assistance to Ukraine. After Ukraine’s Minister of Defence Oleksii Reznikov made a request for military assistance to Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida on 25 February, Japan's Ministry of Defence tried to find workarounds to send equipment to the Ukrainian defence force without breaking Tokyo’s strict regulations on arms transfer.
The Japanese public generally favours a strong response against Russia. A survey conducted by Nikkei-TV Tokyo at the end of March 2022 showed that 67% of respondents approved Japan's firm stance against Russia.
The Ukraine invasion created a fault line between developed liberal democracies and the Global South when it comes to sanctions against Russia. Many developing nations in Southeast Asia, Latin America and Africa refused to take sides, partly because they have close cooperation with Moscow and partly because they see the West’s pressure on Russia as an act of double standards.
Finally, the long-pacifist country is openly debating whether to increase its defence budget amid an increasingly precarious security environment. For years, Japan has kept its defence spending at around 1% of gross domestic product (GDP) despite being surrounded by less-than-friendly states such as China, Russia, and North Korea. At the regional and global levels, Tokyo chose to focus on economic diplomacy and soft power, relying on the U.S.-Japan alliance and avoiding a leading role in addressing security issues.
Japan has been enhancing its military preparedness in recent years by deploying more tactical units to strategically critical locations and openly debating raising defence spending. For example, it has added military units to its southernmost islands near the Senkaku Islands, which China also claims.
At first glance, these moves look like efforts to counter China's growing military capabilities and its attempt to change the status-quo at the East China Sea, South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. New military outposts are all placed in Southern Japan but not in Hokkaido, which is only 350 km from the Russia-controlled Kuril Islands. Japan also has reasons not to fear a direct threat from Russia as the ongoing war in Ukraine and Western sanctions have severely weakened Russia's military capabilities and economy, hastening its decline.
The growing military cooperation between China and Russia raises the prospect that these two countries might collaborate in future conflicts, thus requiring Japan to adopt a more robust security posture. In its newest Defence White Paper, Japan's Ministry of Defence characterized Russia-China military cooperation as becoming “more conspicuous, as if to promote it as 'strategic coordination' movements.”
While deterrence is critical to Tokyo’s response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the authors see that a policy that buttresses and invests in resilience are identified as critical as well. Here, Tokyo is particularly concerned with energy security and food, energy and commodity supply chains being tangentially disrupted by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
In its Indo-Pacific backyard, the recent meeting on 17 August 2022 between Director General of the National Security Agency Takeo Akiba and China’s top foreign affairs official Yang Jie stressed that the momentum for dialogue was waning, with the cancellation of the foreign ministers' meeting due to the growing tensions in the Taiwan Strait. Concerns about hegemonic actions such as China’s strengthening of military activities around Taiwan could not be dismissed and the path toward stable relations remained unclear.
For Tokyo, concerns about China weaponizing and monopolizing supply chains, disruption in the sea lines of communication or using military force, grey zone, or lawfare to change the regions’ security, economic architecture, and regional order continue to deepen.
In response to this two-prong concern, Tokyo has been inculcating resilience into its bilateral relations with both Russia and China to manage these risks. With regards to Russia and energy security, while still aiming for a decarbonized society, the Kishida administration has pragmatically chosen to restart some of its nuclear reactors to decrease the burden of increased energy costs in the wake of the invasion.
According to a survey of 24,854 companies nationwide conducted by Teikoku Databank from mid- to late April 2022, resilience is being inculcated into the Japanese economy at least at two levels to deal with Russia-related inflation. First, the survey found that businesses in the surveyed have taken measures including passing on the cost to the selling price, switching to alternative products, and changing suppliers and routes. However, companies operating in the steel, nonferrous, and mining industries still face major problems due to a lack of alternatives, or they are unable to switch to alternative products or change suppliers because they do not use generic products”.
Second, the Japanese government has introduced numerous emergency measures at home to decrease the cost of fuel for businesses and families.
In contrast, resilience policies targeted at China have only accelerated.
Examples include Japan’s participation in the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). Its focus on fair trade, supply chain resilience, clean energy with decarbonization and infrastructure, as well as proper taxation and anti-corruption will contribute to Japan’s efforts to ensure supply chain resilience, but it is not the only initiative Japan is leveraging. Japan with other Quad partners also announced a ‘Common Statement of Principles on Critical Technology Supply Chains’ and established a “Critical and Emerging Technology Working Group, through which all Quad members are committed to joint efforts in making critical technology supply chains more resilient, underpinned by shared values as free and open societies.
Seen alongside other initiatives such as the Quad Cooperation in Climate Change and launch of the Quad Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Package (Q-CHAMP), Tokyo is attempting to bolster resilience in the region and its relationships by investing in energy security and climate initiatives.
Engagement has not been outside of the diplomatic toolbox when it comes to Japan’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Mostly exemplified by trade agreements but also non-traditional security cooperation, engagement demonstrates that Tokyo understands that effective dealing with challengers to international order still requires engagement for national security and prosperity but for problem-solving at the global level. However, it is less apparent compared with Japan’s engagement with China. The reason is primarily economic in nature, with Japan’s continued economic sustainability and prosperity being directly linked to its biggest trading partner China. In 2021, Japan’s exports to China totalled US$206.2 billion, imports from China totalled US$165.9 billion, direct investment from China to Japan was US$0.5 billion (inflow, in 2020) and direct investment from Japan to China: US$3.4billion (inflow, in 2020).
In contrast, Russia-Japan economic relations remain modest at best. Trade statistics from Japan’s Ministry of Finance show that in calendar year 2021, the value of Japanese imports from Russia rose 34.8% from 2020, to ¥1.5 trillion, which represents 1.8% of Japan’s total import value of ¥84.6 trillion.
In the case of Russia, economic engagement crumbled on 24 February 2022, with the Kishida administration immediately and surprisingly standing side-by-side with other G7 leaders in condemning Russia’s flagrant invasion and attempt to change the current international order by force. Tokyo has proactively sanctioned Russia including “restrictions on transactions with Russia’s central bank, freezing assets of Russian entities and individuals, excluding Russian banks from the SWIFT messaging system, imposing export controls on goods such as semiconductors, and suspending visa issuance, among other things.”
However, Japan maintains its energy-related engagement with Russia by allowing Japanese trading houses Mitsui & Co. and Mitsubishi Corp to continue to participate in the Sakhalin-2 oil and gas energy project, a step toward procuring stable supplies of liquefied natural gas for resource-poor Japan.
Being Japan’s biggest trading partner, China continues to be engaged with Japan economically following the Russian invasion at three levels. First, it is consistent with Japan’s long- term efforts to embed Beijing in a series of trade agreements such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) which came into force 1 January 2022. This engagement occurred despite record low favourability ratings of China in Japan, COVID-19 and increasingly difficult geopolitical realities associated with Chinese assertive behaviour across the Taiwan strait, in and around the Senkaku islands and the South China Sea. This engagement continues alongside continued interest in a trilateral Free Trade Agreement between Japan, China, and South Korea and the acceptance of China and Taiwan’s application to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), however unlikely their membership prospects may be.
In short, Japan’s engagement with both Russia and China post-invasion is based on structural relations between the three states and the invasion has not fundamentally shifted Japanese thinking about economic engagement with China. Economic engagement with Russia will continue but will be increasingly limited by an already existing paucity in economic ties between Japan and Russia.
This paper finds that Japan’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is best articulated as a blending of realism and liberal institutionalism to foreign policy. It also finds that Japan’s response is related to its concerns about China’s intentions in the Indo-Pacific and concerns that force may be used to achieve Chinese national security objectives, as was the case with Russia. Through a three-pronged strategy, combining deterrence, resilience and engagement, and aimed towards both Russia and the Russia-China alignment, Japan is attempting to protect the rules-based order through Japan’s FOIP vision, an enhanced Japan-U.S. alliance, the diversification of trade security partnerships, and middle power diplomacy.
FOIP provides the framework for engagement, building resilience and deterrence. It is complemented by the enhancement of the U.S.-Japan alliance, a growing number of security and strategic partnerships, and neo-middle power diplomacy, in which middle powers are proactively engaging in behaviour that could be categorized as lobbying, insulating, and rulemaking in the realms of security, trade, and international law. Nascent institutions such as the Quad and the newly minted Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) may provide further support to enhance deterrence/balancing, resilience and engagement, and aimed towards both Russia and the Russia-China alignment.
All data underlying the results are available as part of the article and no additional source data are required.
Japan’s Cabinet Secretariat (announcements collected from its website)
Japan’s Ministry of Defense (announcements collected from its website)
Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (announcements collected from its website)
Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (announcements collected from its website)
Prime Minister’s Office of Japan (announcements collected from its website)
Prospect Foundation (announcements collected from its website)
Thailand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (announcements collected from its website)
The Observatory of Economic Complexity (economic data of Japan’s economy)
U.S. Department of State (announcements collected from its website)
Polls (collected from Nikkei Asia, Kyodo News, and The Asahi Shimbun)
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63 Masafumi Ishii, “The lessons of the Ukraine war for the Indo-Pacific Region: a preview of, rather than a change in, what we will face in 10–15 years,” AJISS-Commentary No. 296, 31 August, 2022,
64 Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Statement by the Press Secretary/Director-General for Press and Public Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the Collision between Japan Coast Guard Patrol Vessels and a Chinese Fishing Trawler in Japan's Territorial Waters off the Senkaku Islands,” 25 September, 2010,
65 Stephen R. Nagy, “Territorial Disputes, Trade and Diplomacy: Examining the repercussions of the Sino-Japanese territorial dispute on bilateral trade,”
66 Knut Alicke, Ed Barriball & Vera Trautwein, “How COVID-19 is reshaping supply chains,” November 23, 2021,
67 Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Common Statement of Principles on Critical Technology Supply Chains,” 24 March, 2022,
68 Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Quad Cooperation in Climate Change and launch of the Quad Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Package (Q-CHAMP),” 24 March, 2022,
69 Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Japan-China Relations (Basic Data),” 24 February, 2022,
70 Nippon, “Japanese Trade with Russia in 2021.” 2 March, 2022,
71 Kristi Govella, “Ukraine: A turning point in Japanese foreign policy?” Pacific Forum PacNet, 15 March, 2022,
72 The Mainichi Shimbun, “Russia OKs Japan trader's investment in Sakhalin 2 energy project,” 31 August, 2022,
This well-written article analyzes Japan’s perceptions of, and reactions to, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Japan’s perceptions of Russia’s actions are rooted in a triple vantage point: first, the breach of state sovereignty; second, the challenge to the rules-based international order; and third, the potential threat of a closer China-Russia alignment as well as of China’s possible emulation of Russia’s actions. Tokyo’s policy response has been threefold: deterrence through sanctions, punitive actions, and non-lethal military assistance to Ukraine; building up resilience in energy security and supply chains; and economic engagement, extensive with China and limited with Russia. The article draws on a rich body of primary and secondary sources, and is clearly thoroughly-researched. The structure is logical and well explained in the introduction.
One of the article’s most valuable contributions is the discussion on the China factor. The article provides useful examples of the intensifying China-Russia alignment. Furthermore, the analysis provides food for thought on what could happen in Asia if a similar conflict were to break out over Taiwan. How would a conflict spill over to Japan, and how would it affect Japan’s energy security and supply chains? A key point of interest and ongoing debate is indeed the extent to which “Ukraine today can be East Asia tomorrow”, a view strongly supported in Tokyo. In this context the article rightly points out that the Ukraine war as well as the growing China-Russia alignment have provided Tokyo with a further incentive to strengthen its military. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has also generated greater public support in Japan for a beefed-up security and defense policy. In this light it would, therefore, be important to update the article and include a short discussion on Japan’s new National Security Strategy (NSS) of 16 December 2022, the decision to raise the defense budget to 2% of GDP within the next 5 years, and the proclaimed goal to acquire counterstrike capabilities, for example. This would further strengthen the section on deterrence.
On a more critical note, on occasion the article introduces key concepts without fully explaining them. Furthermore, the conclusion could be linked in a stronger way to the analysis in the body text. For example, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision (formerly strategy) occurs twice in the conclusion. The authors argue that it provides the framework for engagement, building resilience and deterrence. However, the concept is only mentioned briefly on one occasion in the body text and not explained fully. How does it tie in with aid policy, and how does it function as a framework for building resilience? As another example, the conclusion argues that Japan’s response has been a blend of realism and liberal institutionalism, but there is no further explanation as for how this may be the case. Finally, the notion of neo-middle power diplomacy suddenly occurs in the conclusion. While the concept is briefly explained, it could have been introduced earlier, or empirical data could have been used more to underscore this notion. At the very least a footnote could be added with references and some further elaboration.
Is the work clearly and accurately presented and does it cite the current literature?
Yes
If applicable, is the statistical analysis and its interpretation appropriate?
Yes
Are all the source data underlying the results available to ensure full reproducibility?
Yes
Is the case presented with sufficient detail to be useful for the teaching or other practitioners?
Yes
Are the conclusions drawn adequately supported by the results?
Partly
Is the background of the case’s history and progression described in sufficient detail?
Yes
Reviewer Expertise:
Japan, international affairs, security, Indo-Pacific, EU-Asia relations
I confirm that I have read this submission and believe that I have an appropriate level of expertise to confirm that it is of an acceptable scientific standard.
The article aims to present Japan's perception of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the response taken on this basis. The content fully corresponds to the title. The paper is well structured, and the parts naturally and logically follow each other. The considered issues are interesting for IR research. Moreover, studies on the reception of Asian countries to this conflict are limited. Therefore, the article presents condensed research presented in a convenient way for the reader. The authors give two research questions that are logically connected and coherent as one. The article also presents the complexity and dynamics of international relations and highlights how seemingly distant areas influence each other.
The authors used primary and secondary sources. The first referred to the official statements of the Japanese authorities. Second, come from scientific and academic research. What needed to be added in the introduction was a broader presentation of the research procedure itself, which the authors carried out. The authors have interesting observations and present them to the reader in an understandable way. As the authors rightly pointed out, unfortunately, in the last part of the article - conclusions: the position of Japan is a combination of two theoretical assumptions of international relations: realism and liberal institutionalism. It would be worth mentioning them in the introduction and briefly explaining them. What is more, justification for combining two theoretically opposing paradigms flow more convincingly to the reader.
The article may be indexed in this form. Authors may or may not consider the comments of the reviewers.
Is the work clearly and accurately presented and does it cite the current literature?
Yes
If applicable, is the statistical analysis and its interpretation appropriate?
Not applicable
Are all the source data underlying the results available to ensure full reproducibility?
Yes
Is the case presented with sufficient detail to be useful for the teaching or other practitioners?
Partly
Are the conclusions drawn adequately supported by the results?
Yes
Is the background of the case’s history and progression described in sufficient detail?
Yes
Reviewer Expertise:
Asian Studies, International Political Economy,
I confirm that I have read this submission and believe that I have an appropriate level of expertise to confirm that it is of an acceptable scientific standard.
Drawing on a rich source of primary sources in Japanese, policy papers and previous research, this article successfully demonstrates that Japan views the invasion of Ukraine by Russia through the lens of engagement, resilience and deterrence. With those conclusions, Tokyo has adopted a set of policies that reflect its concerns about Moscow's rejection of a rules-based order but also deep concern about a deepening Russo-China partnership that aims to revise the regional order in the Indo-Pacific. Through well researched examples that are backed-up by government speeches and official documents the authors have drawn a link between responses to Russia's aggression and Tokyo's policy choices in its back yard. The article provides a concrete and contemporary set of examples of Japan's approach to revisionist powers. Its conclusions are reflected in Japan's new National Security Strategy that was released in late 2023 demonstrating that the authors' analysis is manifested into concrete policy. Scholars and researchers interested in Japan's foreign policy evolution will find this article to be rich in concrete examples of Japan's non-zero sum approach to managing its complicated relationship with China while at the same time refuting narratives that Japan's is militarizing or pursuing a path that is deviating from its defence-oriented post WW-2 national security approaches.
Is the work clearly and accurately presented and does it cite the current literature?
Yes
If applicable, is the statistical analysis and its interpretation appropriate?
Yes
Are all the source data underlying the results available to ensure full reproducibility?
Yes
Is the case presented with sufficient detail to be useful for the teaching or other practitioners?
Yes
Are the conclusions drawn adequately supported by the results?
Yes
Is the background of the case’s history and progression described in sufficient detail?
Yes
Reviewer Expertise:
Political economy, Asia, Australia, China, US, Indo-Pacific, middle powers, statecraft.
I confirm that I have read this submission and believe that I have an appropriate level of expertise to confirm that it is of an acceptable scientific standard.